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Abstract. Distributed ORAM (DORAM) is a multi-server variant of Oblivious RAM. Originally pro-
posed to lower bandwidth, DORAM has recently been of great interest due to its applicability to secure
computation in the RAM model, where circuit complexity and rounds of communication are equally
important metrics of efficiency. All prior DORAM constructions either involve linear work per server
(e.g., Floram) or logarithmic rounds of communication between servers (e.g., square root ORAM). In
this work, we construct the first DORAM schemes in the 2-server, semi-honest setting that simulta-
neously achieve sublinear server computation and constant rounds of communication. We provide two
constant-round constructions, one based on square root ORAM that has O(
√
N logN) local computa-
tion and another based on secure computation of a doubly efficient PIR that achieves local computation
of O(N ε) for any ε > 0 but that allows the servers to distinguish between reads and writes. As a building
block in the latter construction, we provide secure computation protocols for evaluation and interpo-
lation of multivariate polynomials based on the Fast Fourier Transform, which may be of independent
interest.
Keywords: Distributed Oblivious RAM, Square Root ORAM, Doubly Efficient PIR, Secure Multi-
Party Computation, Fast Fourier Transform
1 Introduction
Oblivious RAM (ORAM) has been a vigorous area of study for the last three decades since it was intro-
duced by Goldreich and Ostrovsky [16]. ORAM focuses on a client-server model where the server stores an
outsourced database upon which the client wishes to execute a series of reads and writes. ORAM provides
privacy, hiding the contents of the database, as well obliviousness, hiding the client’s access patterns. In the
traditional client-server model the client is assumed to be trusted. Recent efforts in the field have focused
on lower bounds [33], optimal bandwidth [2, 29], and various different settings [14,30].
Distributed ORAM (DORAM) is a variant of the basic client-server ORAM model in which there are
multiple non-colluding servers. Data is duplicated across the servers and the client interacts with both as
part of an access. The client again remains the only trusted party. It was first introduced by Ostrovsky
and Shoup [28], and later formally defined by Lu and Ostrovsky [24]. Lu and Ostrovsky were motivated by
the desire to circumnavigate existing lower bounds in the single-server setting for bandwidth overhead, and
their construction achieved O(logN) overhead by leveraging two non-communicating servers. Following their
seminal paper there have been a number of works in the DORAM model that further reduce bandwidth [1,6],
reduce blocksize [23], or achieve practical efficiency [35].
Another advantage of the multi-server model of DORAM is its natural application to secure computation
over databases in the RAM model. Traditional secure computation relies on a circuit representation that
is at least linear in the size of the data over which it computes. This is prohibitive for any sublinear com-
putation run on a database, such as binary search. Lu and Ostrovsky observe in [24] that the application
of DORAM in this case is highly advantageous. The parties in the secure computation can simply emulate
the DORAM client for any database access. In particular, they present a generic transformation from a
2-server DORAM scheme to a 2-party secure computation. It should be noted that works applying ORAM
to secure computation are not limited to the DORAM setting, but also include adaptations of single server
schemes. For example, there has been significant work on adapting tree-based ORAM schemes [31, 32] for
secure computation. All of these DORAM constructions can be used in general-purpose secure computation
like garbled RAM schemes [12,13,15,25], or in special-purpose protocols like dynamic searchable encryption
schemes [19].
There are two main approaches to constructing ORAM for secure computation: the first is to apply a
generic MPC compiler, such as Garbled Circuits, to a ORAM or DORAM client [17, 18, 31, 32], and the
second is to design a client specifically implemented by the two servers [4,10,21,34]. There are a number of
works that focus directly on the second model, which offers greater flexibility since the servers are typically
afforded much more storage space than the client.
However, in both approaches, the multi-server setting introduces a new set of challenges apart from
those found in the single-server ORAM setting. Wang et al. [31] also observe that the traditional efforts to
optimize bandwidth overhead are ineffective in a setting where there are other controlling factors, such as
the size of the circuit representation of the ORAM client. This is the motivation behind their Circuit ORAM
construction, which focuses on optimizing circuit size. Doerner and shelat [10] also show that in many cases,
bandwidth is not the limiting factor but rather the latency between the two servers. This encouraged them
to build a constant round DORAM for secure computation. Previous constructions had relied on recursive
structures, which incurred a O(logN) rounds for each access, a prohibitive cost for latency dominated secure
computation settings. Subsequent works in the constant round setting worked on improving on the O(
√
N)
overhead of Floram, achieving O(log3N) overhead [21], or O(
√
N) in a black-box setting [4]. As with the
original construction, these subsequent works require linear local computation for each server. While for
small N , latency costs may still dominate, for sufficiently large N this linear work is prohibitive. This leaves
us with the following question:
Can we construct a 2-server Distributed ORAM for secure computation that achieves both constant
round and sublinear server work?
In this work, we answer the above question in the affirmative.
1.1 Our contributions
We present the first DORAM constructions in the 2-server, semi-honest secure computation setting to achieve
constant rounds and sublinear local computation on the servers.
– Our first sublinear DORAM construction achieves constant rounds and amortized local computation and
bandwidth cost of O(
√
N logN) per access. It is based on square-root ORAM and has a modular build,
allowing for subsequent improvements in the functionalities we rely on to be easily substituted.
– Our second sublinear DORAM construction is based on a secure computation of Doubly Efficient Private
Information Retrieval (DEPIR) where the distinction between reads and writes is no longer hidden. In
this setting, we achieve constant rounds with local computation and bandwidth of O(N ε · poly(λ)) for
any ε > 0.
As an crucial building block toward the second construction, we present a secure two-party computation
protocol for the Fast Fourier Transform (FFT) for multivariate polynomial evaluation and interpolation in
quasilinear time and with only local computation; this may be of independent interest.
1.2 Technical Overview
In this section, we describe both of our DORAM constructions in more detail.
Sublinear DORAM. We start with describing the original square-root ORAM (introduced by Goldreich
and Ostrovsky [16]) that our construction is based on. There is a single read-only array of size N , which
we call the store, and a writable stash of
√
N size. Elements in the store are (address, value) pairs; at
initialization, the elements are permuted with a permutation known only to the client, and all elements are
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encrypted. To perform a read at a particular address, the client checks the stash using a linear scan; if not
present then it reads the permuted element from the read-only store, and if present then it is retrieved from
the stash and a random ‘dummy’ element is made to the store instead. The newly-read element is placed in
the stash, in order to maintain the invariant that each element is read only once from the store. In the case
of a write, a dummy is read from the store and the element is written in the stash. After enough queries
have been made to fill the stash, a duration that which we call an epoch, the elements from the stash are
reshuffled back into the main store, with only the newest write at each location being kept.
While the basic square-root ORAM construction achieves constant rounds with sublinear communication
and server computation, it is non-trivial to convert it to a two-party DORAM. There are two major issues
incurred by shifting this to the two party case: (1) representing the permutation over the elements of the
store and (2) merging the elements from the stash back into the store.
We first discuss how to represent the permutation that maps addresses to physical locations in the store.
In [34], which is also based on square root ORAM, they choose to represent the permutation as a shared array
in recursive ORAMs. This improves computation complexity but leads to O(logN) rounds of communication.
To maintain constant rounds, we must instead find a compact representation of the permutation. We look
for inspiration from the original square-root scheme. There, they generate a random ‘tag’ for each element
in the store using a random oracle and then sort the elements according to the tag. A lookup then involves
only a random oracle evaluation and a binary search across the sorted elements. However, because it is a
single server scheme, they must use an oblivious sorting network in order to break the correlation between
items in different epochs, which does not run efficiently in constant rounds. We leverage the fact that we
have a two servers to break up the oblivious sort into its two components, ‘oblivious’ + ‘sort’. To prevent
the server from mapping items between epochs, we use a simple constant round functionality to obliviously
permute elements that allows each server to permute the elements in turn. As long as one server is honest, the
data is permuted obliviously. This allows us to generate the tags using an oblivious pseudorandom function
(OPRF), rather than a random oracle, on the newly obliviously permuted elements and then sort the tags
locally. Lookup again is just an OPRF evaluation on the address shares and then a local binary search on
the store.
The second challenge arises during the reshuffling phase of the protocol. In the original square-root
ORAM, elements are simply moved back into their original locations (updated elements in the store, dummies
back in the stash) by executing another oblivious shuffle. To solve this in constant rounds, we again exploit
the ability to obliviously permute elements by using our two server architecture. In order to do that though,
we must ensure that the elements that we are permuting do not contain any duplicates. For example, if
a read was executed on index i, there would be two copies of element i, one in the stash and one in the
store. To solve this issue, we note that the elements that have been read in the store is public knowledge to
both servers. As long as we maintain the invariant if an element has been read (or written to), it is in the
stash, and each element only occurs in the stash once, we can simply concatenate elements in the stash with
the unread elements in the store at the end of an epoch. Once we have concatenated the elements we can
obliviously permute them to get our new store. The stash can then just be filled with new dummy elements.
A more detailed discussion of our construction can be found in Section 3.
DORAM with Unlimited Reads. Thanks to the modularity of our base scheme, the components are
easily extensible. In the second half of this work, we improve the performance of the read-only data store
while keeping the rest of the construction (the stash, our periodic shuffling technique at the end of each
epoch, etc) mostly intact.
The separation of our read-only store from a read-and-writable stash suggests an intriguing tradeoff: if
we are willing to leak whether each operation is a read or a write operation, then it is beneficial to design
an efficient read-only store that supports unlimited reads, and only pay for accessing the stash on (hopefully
infrequent) write operations. This optimization allows us to increase the duration of each epoch, or in other
words to amortize the cost of each shuffle over more reads. Concretely, in a scenario where the ratio of
reads-to-writes is about N -to-1, then for any constant ε > 0 we can construct a read-only store where whose
amortized cost per query is just Oλ(N
ε). Here, the notation Oλ means that we suppress poly(λ) terms in
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order to focus on the dependency on the database size. By reducing the size of the stash to Oλ(N
ε), we can
support write operations with this performance as well.
Our strategy to construct a unlimited-reads store might seem counterintuitive at first: we start from a
doubly efficient PIR [3, 5] that supports unlimited reads and convert it into a two-server distributed data
store. A doubly efficient private information retrieval (DEPIR) scheme is a client-server protocol for oblivious
access to a public dataset that only requires sublinear computation for both the client and server operations
and constant rounds of communication between the two. At first glance, it may seem that a 1-server DEPIR
is a strictly stronger primitive than a 2-server DORAM, so we might expect to construct the latter generically
as a secure computation of the former. However, this intuition isn’t true because there are three properties
that we aim to satisfy with DORAM, but that (even a doubly efficient) PIR does not:
– Support for writes,
– Hiding the contents of the database, in addition to access patterns, and
– Ensuring that the secure computation is constant rounds when the two parties collectively emulate the
(sublinear but not constant time) client, in addition to the client-server communication.
The main observation underlying this approach is that the SK-DEPIR protocol of Canetti et al. [5] is
highly amenable toward secure computation since its operations mostly involve linear algebra in a finite field
that can be done purely locally, plus bitstring and set operations that are easy to handle in constant rounds.
The Canetti et al. SK-DEPIR construction is based on a locally decodable code (LDC) in the style of a
Reed-Muller code, which encodes a dataset as a multivariate polynomial. As a result, the most challenging
part of our multiparty computation protocol involves securely emulating the client’s procedures to evaluate
or interpolate a multivariate polynomial at O(N) points. The naive methods for polynomial evaluation
(via application of the Vandermonde matrix) or polynomial interpolation (via the Lagrange interpolation
polynomial) involve multiplication of a public matrix by a secret-shared vector, which can be done non-
interactively but requires O(N2) computation, which is too slow for our purposes.
Given a binary field F = GF(2`) and a subspace Hm ⊂ Fm, we construct secure computation protocols
for evaluating or interpolating an m-variate polynomial p ∈ F[x1, . . . , xm] on all points in Hm in time that
is quasilinear (rather than quadratic) in |Hm|. This protocol may be of independent interest, and in our
protocol it is needed to achieve our goal of sublinear computation for the overall DORAM scheme. We
construct this secure computation scheme in two stages: first we construct a secure computation protocol
for the Additive Fast Fourier Transform protocol of Gao and Mateer [11] for univariate polynomials over a
binary field, and then we bootstrap this protocol to handle multivariate polynomials by using recursion on
the number of variables in the polynomial as previously shown by Kedlaya and Umans [22]. All operations in
this protocol reduce to linear combinations of secret variables, so the entire computation can be done locally
by each party on their own boolean secret shares without the need for any communication.
1.3 Related Work
We focus on schemes that are directly designed for secure computation. A direct comparison of their local
computation, bandwidth, and number of rounds can be seen in Table 1. The construction of Zahur et al. [34]
is very similar to our basic construction, but instead of implementing the permutation by OPRF evaluation,
they use Waksman networks and a recursive position map. This allows for sublinear server work but that
the cost of non-constant rounds. Doerner et al [10] uses function secret sharing to obtain a scheme with very
good practical efficiency, but their need for linear server work limits scalability to large database lengths N .
Gordon et al. [18] is in the more general DORAM model but uses PIR over tree-based ORAM. They are able
to obtain O(logN) bandwidth but as with Doerner et al. they require linear local computation. Jarecki et al.
focus on decreasing the round complexity and bandwidth of SC-DORAMs while still maintaining sublinear
server computation. They are able to get the best combined set of parameters, but are still not able to
achieve constant rounds of communication. Finally, Bunn et al. achieve a 3-server DORAM scheme that
achieves constant rounds and sublinear bandwidth, while providing a black-box construction. However, as
with [10,18] they require linear server work.
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Table 1. Comparison of access in DORAM schemes for Secure Computation. Asterisks indicate schemes where the
stash size is assumed to be O(logN) and O(N ε), respectively, and the distinction between read and write is not
hidden.
No. Servers Local Comp. Bandwidth Rounds









Floram [10] 2 O(N) O(
√
N) O(1)
Florom* [10] 2 O(N) O(logN) O(1)
Gordon et al. [18] 2 O(N) O(logN) O(1)
Jarecki et al. [21] 3 O(log3N) O(log3N) O(logN)
Bunn et al. [4] 3 O(N) O(
√
N) O(1)









In this section, we provide several definitions and constructions of existing cryptographic primitives that we
leverage in this work. We begin with a brief summary of our notation.
Given a bitstring x ∈ {0, 1}`, a 2-of-2 boolean secret sharing 〈x〉 denotes the uniformly selection of two
bitstrings x1 for party 1 and x2 for party 2 subject to the constraint that their boolean-xor x1 ⊕ x2 = x. A
binary field F = GF(2`) is a finite field of characteristic 2; there is a canonical bijection F ↔ {0, 1}` such
that field addition corresponds to boolean-xor. Hence, we overload the notation 〈f〉 so that it applies to field
elements f ∈ F. This secret sharing scheme commutes with linear algebra in the field, i.e., 〈cf + c′f ′〉 =
c〈f〉+c′〈f ′〉 can be computed locally by each server from public constants c, c′ ∈ F. and secret shares 〈f〉, 〈f ′〉.
We use the convention of 0-indexing, with [N ] = {0, 1, . . . , N − 1} as containing all whole numbers less
than N . Additionally, S × S′ denotes the Cartesian product of two sets. Bold letters v denote vectors,
subscripts vi indicate the i
th element of a vector, and (wi)i∈[N ] constructs a vector from an ordered list of
items w0, w1, . . . , wN−1. The notation ‖ denotes concatenation of bitstrings, sets, or vectors into a single
object of longer length containing the (ordered) union of all elements.
The notation x← D indicates taking a sample from a probability distribution D. By abuse of notation,
x← S indicates sampling from the uniform distribution over set S; we sometimes use x $← S for emphasis. We
use ≈ to indicate computational indistinguishability of two distributions; that is, D ≈ D′ if no probabilistic
polynomial time adversary A has a noticeable difference in output when given a sample from D or D′.
2.1 Distributed Memory
First introduced by Bunn et al. [4], the ideal functionality Fmem in Figure 1 captures the behavior achieved
by a DORAM. The database is initialized on secret shares of the database, and subsequent accesses are also
secret shared, as is their resulting output. This version of the definition deviates from the original in that
the Init functionality returns shares of the database, and the access protocol takes in those same shares. This
syntactic difference is included only to make our own proofs cleaner and does not fundamentally change the
definition. While Bunn et al. provide a viable 3-server construction that meets this ideal functionality and
provides the necessary performance; we leverage the construction of Doerner et al. [10] that requires only
2-servers. From their construction, we obtain Lemma 1.
Lemma 1. There exists a protocol ΠDORAM that implements the functionality Fmem with the following
complexity:
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Fig. 1. Functionality Fmem
1. On input of (Init, D̃B), set DB = D̃B, return random additive shares of DBs to party s.
2. On input additive shares of (op, elem,DB) from two parties do:
(a) if op = read then set o = DB[addr]
(b) if op = write then set o = DB[addr] and DB[addr] = val
(c) Let o1, o2 be random, additive shares of o, and DBs be random additive shares of DB. Return (os,DBs)
to party s.




– Initializing the functionality results in O(1) rounds of communication, O(n) local server computation,
and O(n) communication bandwidth.
2.2 Distributed Oblivious Pseudo-random Function
Distributed Oblivious Pseudo-random Function (DOPRF) achieves a distributed evaluation of a PRF be-
tween two parties. Typically one party hold the key, and the other the input, and only the second party
learns the output. We require a variation of this ideal functionality, presented in Figure 2, in which both
the key and the input are additively secret shared between two the two parties and both parties receive the
output of the evaluation.
We introduce a construction in Figure 3 which meets our new ideal functionality that is effectively the
semi-honest version of the DOPRF of Miao et al. [26], which itself is based on the work of Jarecki and
Liu [20]. With only a small modification that allows the input and key to be secret-shared between the two
servers. The construction leverages the Dodis-Yampolskiy pseudorandom function F (k, x) = g1/(k+x) [9],
and it is secure under the q-Diffie Hellman inversion (q-DHI) assumption using a similar argument as in [26].
Fig. 2. Functionality FDOPRF
The functionality is assumed to be initialized with PRF f .
1. Upon receiving (x1, k1) from party 1 and (x2, k2) from party 2, compute σ = fk1+k2(x1 + x2) .
2. Returns σ to both party 1 and 2
2.3 Constant-Round Equality Check
The functionality introduced in Figure 4 allows for two parties to check if the element for which they both
hold shares is present in a database for which they also hold shares. In particular it returns shares of a
boolean b indicating the presence of a match, and if so the shares of that address. The database follows the
invariant that there is only a single match within the database for the element. Both Damgard et al. and
Nishide et al. [8, 27] construct solutions that achieve the computation3 with constant rounds.
3 The exact functionality including the indicator bit is not included in their constructions, but they can be easily be
extended with an additional round of a conditional computations.
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Fig. 3. DOPRF Protocol, using ElGamal encryption (ENC,DEC)
Server 1 input: x1, k1 Common: G, q = |G|, g ← G Server 2 input: x2, k2
choose key pair (sk, pk) pk, C = ENCpk(k1 + x1) choose a← [q], b← [q2λ]
let α = a(k2 + x2) + bq
decrypt β = DECsk(C
∗) C
∗, h = ga let C∗ = ENCpk(α) · Ca
let γ = β−1 mod q
= a(k + x)
output σ = hγ σ output σ
Fig. 4. Functionality FEQ−DB




from both parties 1 and 2, computes
DBeq = {xi
?
= x | xi ∈ DB}.
2. Let b =
∨
xi∈DBeq xi indicate if there was a match. If b is non-zero, let addr
s be random, additive shares of
addr such that DBeq[addr] = 1 otherwise, let addr
s be random shares of zero. Return (bs, addrs) to party s.
2.4 Doubly Efficient Private Information Retrieval
First introduced by Canetti et al. and Boyle et al. [3, 5], Doubly Efficent Private Information Retrieval
(DEPIR) is a variant of PIR achieving sub-linear server work by allowing pre-processing of the database.
The major building block DEPIR is locally decodably codes (LDCs). Specifically, an application of Reed-
Muller Codes, which allows for smooth LDCs.
Definition 1 (Smooth LDC). A s-smooth, k-query locally decodable code with message length N , code-
word size M , with alphabet Σ is denoted by (s, k,N,M)Σ-smooth LDC and consists of a tuple of PPT
algorithms (Enc,Query,Dec) with the following syntax:
– Enc takes a message m ∈ ΣN and outputs a codeword c ∈ ΣM
– Query takes a index i ∈ [N ] and outputs a vector x = (x1, . . . , xk) ∈ [M ]N
– Dec takes in vector codeword symbols c = (cx1 , . . . , cxk) ∈ ΣN and outputs a symbol y ∈ Σ
And has the following properties:
– Local Decodability: For all messages m ∈ ΣL and every index i ∈ [N ]:
Pr[Dec(Enc(m)x) = mi : x← Query(i)] = 1
– Smoothness: For all indices i ∈ [N ], a LDC is s-smooth if when sampling (x1, . . . , xk) ← Query(i),
(x1, . . . , xk) is uniformly distributed on [N ]
s for every distinct subset of size s.
We now formally introduce DEPIR, in particular the secret key variant, called SK-DEPIR.
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Definition 2 (Doubly Efficient PIR). A Doubly Efficient PIR (DEPIR) for alphabet Σ consists of a
tuple of PPT algorithms (KeyGen,Process,Query,Resp,Dec) with the following syntax:
– KeyGen takes the security parameter 1λ and outputs the key k
– Process takes a key k, database DB ∈ ΣN and outputs processed database D̃B
– Query takes a key k, database index i ∈ [N ] and outputs a query q and temporary state State
– Resp takes a query q, processed database D̃B and outputs a server response c
– Dec takes a key k, server response c, temporary state State and outputs a database symbol y ∈ Σ
And has the following properties:
– Correctness: For all DB ∈ ΣN and i ∈ [N ]:
Pr












– Double Efficiency: The runtime of KeyGen is poly (λ), the runtime of Process is poly (N,λ), and the
runtime of Query,Dec is o (N) · poly (λ), where N is the database size.
– Security: Any non-uniform PPT adversary A has only negl (λ) advantage in the following security game
with a challenger C:
1. A sends to C a database DB ∈ ΣN .




to obtain a key k, and then runs
D̃B← Process (k,DB) to obtain a processed database D̃B, which it sends to A.
3. A selects two addresses i0, i1 ∈ [N ], and sends (i0, i1) to C.
4. C samples (q,State)← Query(k, ib), and sends 1 to A.
5. Steps 3 and 4 are repeated an arbitrary (polynomial) number of times.
6. A outputs a bit b′, and his advantage in the game is defined to be Pr[b = b′]− 12 .
As shown in [3,5] we can achieve SK-DEPIR with sublinear or poly-log parameters. We will describe one
such construction in Section 4.
Lemma 2. There exists SK-DEPIR schemes with the following parameters, where N is the database size
and λ is the security parameter:
– Sublinear SK-DEPIR: For any ε > 0, the running time of Process can be N1+ε · poly(λ), and the
running time of Query and Dec can be N ε · poly(λ).
– Polylog SK-DEPIR: The running time of Process can be poly(λ,N), and the running time of Query
and Dec can be poly(λ, logN).
3 DORAM with Sublinear Computation
In this section we present our construction that implements the Fmem functionality while achieving sublinear
server work and communication with constant rounds.
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3.1 Construction
In this section, we describe how we bootstrap from a linear-work Fmem to a new protocol ΠDORAM that
also instantiates Fmem but with sublinear work and constant rounds, as desired. The overall architecture of
the scheme can be found in Figure 5. We describe below our implementations of the store and stash.
We implement the stash as an another two-party DORAM (matching the Fmem functionality). We require
a 2-party scheme with constant rounds, this can be instantiated by FLORAM [10] or Gordon et al. [18].
While they have linear server work for each access, because our stash is t =
√
N records in size, this still
results in sublinear server work within our protocol.
We implement the store in Figure 9 as a permuted array of elements sorted by PRF evaluation on the
address of the element. Neither server knows the underlying permutation because it is created using our
oblivious permutation protocol shown in Figure 8. We perform an FDOPRF evaluation across the shares of
the addresses, which allows us to look up records in constant rounds by computing the OPRF based on the
address of the element being searched for, and then each party performs a local binary search on their own
store to find the shares of the element.
At the start of an epoch, the stash contains all the dummy elements and the store contains all the
elements of the database concatenated with t dummy elements. The elements in the store are all permuted
and indexed as above. Note that we consider dummy to be addressed from 1 to t, so valid elements are
indexed started at t. We also have (in the clear) a counter, starting at 1. The access logic is encapsulated
within our access protocol in Figure 7 and proceeds as follows. When we want to do a read, we check if the
element is in the stash by calling FEQ−DB , which returns a secret shared boolean b indicating if the element
is present, as well as the shares of the address to each party if it is present. We then use b as a selector bit in
a shared conditional computation to see if we read the element (if the element is present in the stash) or the
next dummy element (addressed at the counter) in the stash. Then we read an element from the store, using
Fstore, again based on the selector bit. If the element is in the stash, we read the next dummy element at
address counter, if it is not in the stash, we read the element itself. Finally, we write an element back to the
stash, using Fmem, either the dummy element we read (which is just overwriting the same element) if the
element was in the stash, or the element read from the stash. The element is written back at the ‘counter’
location in the stash. The protocol then returns random additive shares of the element being read. If the
operation is instead was a write the only variation in the above process is in the final step writing elements
back to the stash, rather that writing to the ‘counter’ location automatically, if the element was previously
in the stash, it is overwritten at that location.
At the end of an epoch (when the counter reaches t), the overarching ΠDORAM invokes Πshuffle in
Figure 10, which resets the state as mentioned above. In the original square-root ORAM scheme, removing
duplicates required a costly oblivious sort operation, which is not constant round. By contrast, we achieve
a constant-round reshuffling algorithm by leveraging the following invariant of Faccess: if an element has
been read (or written to) it is in the stash, and each element only occurs in the stash once. This invariant
allows us to simply note which elements in the store have been read during the epoch and eliminate them,
knowing that their most recent copy is represented in the stash. This claim applies to dummy elements as
well: during the shuffle operation, we only need to insert new dummy elements to replace those that have
been overwritten in the stash by real writes. Once the unread elements and the current stash have been
permuted obliviously by Fpermute, the stash is reinitialized with the dummy values and counter is reset to
1. We also note that we leverage Fshuffle when we first initialize the DORAM. We call Fshuffle on the
original shares of the secret shared database, concatenated with the necessary dummy elements. The set of
read elements is empty as is the stash, resulting in a permutation of the original database and dummies after
Fpermute is called.
Our oblivious permutation protocol in Figure 8 does two things: it rerandomizes the shares held by each
server and applies the same random permutation to each server’s shares. Beginning with a vector of secret
shares 〈M〉, server 2 begins Πpermute by encrypting her own shares M2 using an additively homomorphic
encryption scheme and sending the result to server 1. Next, server 1 applies the same randomly-chosen
permutation to her own shares M1 as well as the ciphertexts from server 2, and she then rerandomizes each
pair of shares by adding a random value to her own share and subtracting the same value (homomorphically)
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Fig. 5. The overall architecture of the ideal functionalities used in the ΠDORAM construction.
ΠDORAM
Faccess Fshuffle
FEQ−DB Fmem Fstore Fpermute
FDOPRF
Fig. 6. ΠDORAM Protocol
On (Init, 〈DB〉):
1. Server 1 computes V = {(i, 0) | i ∈ [t]}
2. Each server calls Fshuffle on (shuffle, I, State)) where I = {} and State = {DB || V, 0, {}}. Server s receives
(Ss,Ms, ks) as output.
3. Let ctr = 1 and I = {}. For Server s its current state is States = (ctr,Ms, Ss, ks), returns States
On additive shares of (op, elem,State):
1. If ctr = t, call Fshuffle on (shuffle, I, State) and update state for Server s with (S′s,M′s, k′s). Set ctr = 1 and
I = {}.
2. Call Faccess on additive shares (opi, elemi, State), recovering (iM, 〈elem〉, 〈State〉) and update state for Server
s with S′s. Set I = I ∪ iM and ctr = ctr + 1
3. Return (elems, States) to Server s.
from server 2’s share. She sends encrypted versions of both shares to server 2, who performs the same
permute-and-rerandomize operation and sends the result to server 1 to complete the constant-round oblivious
permutation.
3.2 Complexity Analysis
Now consider the asymptotic complexity of our scheme. We first evaluate the complexity of the underly-
ing protocols, and then compute the amortized complexity of the overall ΠDORAM protocol. The overall
complexity when t =
√
N is shown in Table 2.
– Πpermute: Each server must perform O(N + t) encryption, decryption and other local operations. The
entire encrypted store is sent, again resulting in O(N + t) bandwidth. The protocol runs in 3 rounds, or
O(1).
– Πstore: Here we consider two separate costs, one for initialization, and one for performing an ac-
cess. During initialization, local computation is dominated by the sorting across the OPRF outputs,
O ((N + t) log(N + t)), and bandwidth by the OPRF computation itself, O(N + t). We obtain constant
rounds in initialization by executing all of the OPRF evaluations in parallel. On access, local computation
10
Fig. 7. Πaccess Protocol
1. On additive shares of (op, elemin, State), let elemin = (addrin, valin) and State = (ctr,M
s, ks, S
s), where S is an
array of elem.
2. Find element in stash or read next dummy address:
(a) Compute additive shares of index i by calling FEQ−DB in Figure 4 on additive shares of (addrin, S),
receiving random additive shares (b, i) as output.
(b) Jointly compute random additive shares of iS such that:
iS =
{
i b = 1, element in stash.
ctr b = 0, element not in stash.
(c) Then recover elemS by calling Fmem on secret shares of (read, (iS, 0),S).
3. Look up either the next dummy element or the original element in the store:
(a) Jointly compute random additive shares of addrM:
addrM =
{
ctr b = 1, element in stash.
addrin b = 0, element not in stash.
(b) Call Fstore on the additive shares of (read, addrM,M, ks), recovering (iM, 〈elemM〉).
4. Write the read elemM or input elemin back to stash:
(a) If op = read, jointly compute random additive shares of:
(iW, elemW, elem) =
{
(ctr, elemM, elemS) b = 1, element in stash.
(ctr, elemM, elemM) b = 0, element not in stash.
(b) If op = write, jointly compute random additive shares of:
(iW, elemW, elem) =
{
(iS, elemin, elemin) b = 1, element in stash.
(ctr, elemin, elemin) b = 0, element not in stash.
(c) Call Fmem on additive shares of (write, (iW, elemW), S)a.
5. Server s returns (iM, 〈elem〉, 〈State〉).
a Any functionality that returns an updated share of S or M is assumed to update the held state State, but is
elided for notational simplicity.
Fig. 8. Πpermute Protocol
On input (permute, 〈M〉):
1. Each server runs pks, sks ← KeyGen(1λ) and sends pks to the other server.
2. For s ∈ {1, 2}, and s′ = 3− s












(b) Server s chooses vector of random values {ri ∈ {0, 1}B}i∈[N ], and a random permutation π and updates





π(i)s · ENCpks′ (−r
s




} and sends Cs
′
r to Server s
′
(c) Server s′ decrypts Cs
′
r to get M
s′ = {elems
′
π(i) − rsi | i ∈ [N ]}.
3. Return (M′s) to Server s.
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Fig. 9. Πstore Protocol
On input (Init, 〈M〉):
1. Choose the new random PRF keys for k1 and k2.
2. Server 1 and 2 call on FDOPRF on inputs (k1, addr1i ) and (k2, addr2i ) respectively for all (addri, vali) ∈ M in




i ), and Σ = {σi | i ∈ [N ]}. Both servers sort M′s = {σi, elemi}i∈[N ] in
lexicographic order by σ.
3. Return (Σ,M′s, ks)
On input (read, 〈addri〉, 〈k〉, 〈M〉):
1. Server 1 and Server 2 engage in FDOPRF on inputs (k1, addr1i ) and (k2, addr2i ) respectively. Both servers





2. Each Server s performs a local binary search in Ms for ˜addr and recover its index i and additive shares of
the element elemi. Each server returns (i, elem
s
i ).
Fig. 10. ΠShuffle Protocol
On input (shuffle, State, I):
1. Let State = (Ms, ks,S
s).
2. Let Msr be all unread elements in M
1 and M2, i.e. Mr /∈ I. Set Rs = Msr || Ss.
3. Let V = {(i, 0) | i ∈ [t]} each server calls Fmem on additive shared input (Init,V). Server s receives Ss as
output.
4. Servers 1 and 2 call Fpermute on (permute, 〈R〉). Server s receives (M′s) as output, which in turn it calls
Fstore on (Init,M′s) and receives (Ms, ks) as output.
5. Server s returns (Ss,Ms, ks).
Table 2. A evaluation of each of the protocol’s server computation, bandwidth and rounds of communication where
t =
√
N . Note that the numbers for Πmem are taken from Lemma 1 and ΠDORAM has been amortized where
appropriate.
Local Computation Bandwidth Rounds






















Πstore(Init) O(N logN) O(N) O(1)
Πstore(read) O(logN) O(1) O(1)
Πpermute O(N) O(N) O(1)
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is dominated by searching for the tag, O(log(N + t)), and the only round of interaction and bandwidth
is the OPRF evaluation.
– Πaccess: Finding the element in the stash only takes local computation and bandwidth linear in the stash
size and constant rounds. The two other operations of cost are accessing stash and the store, each of
which take O(t) and O(log(N + t)) local computation and O(
√
t) and O(1) bandwidth respectively. This
leaves access dominated by finding the element in the stash, O(t) local computation and bandwidth4.
– Πshuffle: Shuffle is dominated by the initialization of the store, inheriting the performance and bandwidth
complexity directly from Πstore.
We now consider the amortized complexity of the overall local computation of ΠDORAM during access. We
consider the cost of shuffling averaged over an epoch of t accesses. The cost of accessing a single block,
represented by Πaccess, is O(t). The cost of shuffle is O((N + t) log(N + t)). We can consider the total cost
of local computation during an epoch as:
DLC(N, t) = t(t) + (N + t) log(N + t)
Averaging over t-accesses we get:
DLC(N, t) = t+
N
t
log(N + t) + log(N + t)
If we set t =
√
N we get DLC(n) = O(
√





In this section we provide the overall security statement and ideal functionalities.
Notation and Valid Inputs.. We define a set of notations and valid inputs for our various protocols used
in the following proofs. We assume op ∈ {0, 1} where op = 0 represents a read operation and op = 1 is write.
Valid elements are a tuple of an address and a value where addr ∈ [N ] and val ∈ {0, 1}B . The input database
DB is made up of N valid elements. The store M is represented as key-value store, where the keys are the
output of PRF f with key k and the values consist of valid elements. The stash S is an array of t valid
elements. We define the set of valid inputs for an DORAM of N elements of block size B and t dummies as
DomN,B,t.
Theorem 1. ΠDORAM (Figure 6) implements functionality Fmem and for each party there exists a PPT









where input = {(Init,DB), (opi, elemi, ctr,M,S, k)}, and output = {(ctr,M,S, k), (elem, ctr,M,S, k)}.
Proof (Theorem 1).
4 For any value of t < log(N + t) then the cost of Πstore controls, but in our setting we consider a t greater than
that
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Fig. 11. Simulator Sim for ΠDORAM Protocol
On input
(
input = (Init,DBA), output = (ctr,MA, SA, kA)
)
1. Set I = {} and V = {(i, 0) | i ∈ [t]}.
2. Return as viewADORAM :
viewADORAM = (input, I,V, output)
On input
(
input = (op, elem, ctr,MA,SA, kA), output = (elem, ctr,M
A,SA, kA)
)
1. If ctr = t, set ctr = 1 and let V = {(i, 0) | i ∈ [t]} call Fmem on additive shared input (Init,V). Receiving S′
as output.
2. Choose iM /∈ I ∧ iM ∈ [N ], add I = I ∪ iM.
3. Return as V iewΠDORAMA :
V iewΠDORAMA =
(
input, S′A,MA, kA, ctr, I, output
)
Correctness: The correctness of ΠDORAM follows from inspection of the overall state, both after initializa-
tion and during access. First, consider in the initialization of the DORAM we call Fshuffle. Fshuffle takes
the current store M, stash S, and set of read elements in the store I; it returns shares of the stash containing
the dummy elements and a permuted re-randomized concatenation of the stash and the unread elements
in the store. For initialization, we consider the following input to Fshuffle; we set the store M to be the
original database concatenated with the dummy elements, the stash S is empty, as is the set of read elements
I. Fshuffle returns a permuted re-randomized store consisting of all unread elements in the input store (all
of them in this case) concatenated with the stash (empty in this case), and the stash is initialized with the
dummy elements. The counter ctr is set to 1, and the set of read elements I is set to the empty set.
Consider ongoing accesses to ΠDORAM , during an epoch calls to Faccess maintain the invariant that if an
element has been read (or written to) it is in the stash, and each element only occurs in the stash once. We
also recover the element in M that was read during an access, iM, which we add to the set of read elements
I, and increment the counter ctr by one. When ctr = t, we call Fshuffle and pass in the current store, set of
read elements, and stash. If we combine the invariant that access maintains (read elements are in the stash),
and accurate accounting of read elements in I, the output of Fshuffle contains the same set of elements as its
input, but dummies have been moved back to the stash and read/written elements have been moved back
to the store.
Security: We now argue security, via a sequence of hybrids.
H0: Is the view of the adversary produced by ΠDORAM .
H1: In H1, we replace MA, SA, kA generated in initialization by calling Fshuffle with MA,SA, kA ∈ output.
Indistinguishability of viewH0A and view
H1
A follows as M
A,SA, kA are random additive shares generated by the
same method and thusly share the same distribution in both views.
H2: In H2, we replace elem, ctr,MA,SA and kA generated during an access with the same values in output
(note we do not change the re-shuffling process when ctr = t yet). Indistinguishability of viewH1A and view
H2
A
follows as elem, ctr,MA,SA and kA are generated by the same method and thusly share the same distribution
in both views.
H3: In H3, we replace S′ generated by calling Fshuffle when ctr = t with a call to Fmem on V. Indistin-
guishability of viewH2A and view
H3
A follows as S
′A is a random additive share generated by the same method
(calling Fmem on a valid input) and thusly share the same distribution in both views.
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H4: In H4, we replace iM generated by calling Faccess with a random address not in I. Indistinguishability
of viewH3A and view
H4
A relies on the invariant maintained by access that each element in the stash is read
only once and the fact that the store is randomly permuted. So by selecting a random unread element we
are selecting from the same distribution an actual access would make and thus both views same in the same
distribution over the indices sampled.
Note that the view in H4 is identical to the view produced by the simulator.
Lemma 3. Πaccess in Figure 7 implements functionality Faccess in Figure 12 and for each party there









where input = (op, elem, ctr,M, k,S) and output = (iM, elem, ctr,M, k,S
′).
Proof (Lemma 3).
Correctness: We show that the correctness of Πaccess relies on maintaining the invariant if an element has
been read (or written to) it is in the stash, and each element only occurs in the stash once.5. We consider the
state of the stash after an operation and what element is returned for each possible combination of operation
and stash state to show that invariant is maintained. This assumes all of the conditional operations the
servers participate in are correct, thus the correctness follows from that. Consider the table from the ideal
functionality Faccess (Figure 12), reproduced below:
op addrin ∈ S iS addrM iW elemW elem
read yes addrin ctr ctr elemM elemS
read no ctr addrin ctr elemM elemM
write yes addrin ctr addrin elemin elemin
write no ctr addrin ctr elemin elemin
– op = read, addrin ∈ S: The element is found in the stash (b = 1), meaning in Step 2 when FEQ−DB is
called it returns i, the index the element is found at. This results in the element being read from the
stash being the element at addrin. In Step 3, as we have already found our element, the next dummy
element is read at addrM = ctr. In order to maintain our invariant (and security), the dummy that we
just read in the store must be written back to the stash (even though the element we are overwriting
at ctr is identical). Thus the element written back to the stash in Step 4 is elemW = elemM at iW = ctr.
Finally the element returned is that of the element read from the stash.
– op = read, addrin /∈ S: The element is not found in the stash (b = 0) in Step 2 by calling FEQ−DB ,
meaning the element read from the stash, elemS, is the next dummy element, indexed by S = ctr. This
means we read the original element of the store for Step 3 at addrM = addrin and retrieve the element
we want to read. To maintain the invariant we need to make sure the element we read is added to the
stash in Step 4, overwriting the dummy at ctr. Note that the dummy element stored at the location we
overwrite in the stash will never have the chance to be read in the store as we increment the counter for
the next read, so it remains amongst the unread elements in the store and the invariant is maintained.
Finally the element returned is that of the element read from the store.
5 Another way to represent this invariant is to say that all unread elements (including dummies indexed up to ctr)
unioned with elements in the stash does not yield any duplicate items.
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Fig. 12. Functionality Faccess
On additive shares of (op, elemin,State) where State = (ctr,M, k, S) and elemin = (addrin, valin) set
iS, addrM, iW, elemW and elem during the protocol according to the below table (as defined by op and if addr∈ is
found in the stash):
op addrin ∈ S iR addrM iW elemW elem
read yes addrin ctr ctr elemM elemS
read no ctr addrin ctr elemM elemM
write yes addrin ctr addrin elemin elemin
write no ctr addrin ctr elemin elemin
1. Recover elemS by calling Fmem on secret shares of (read, (iR, 0),S).
2. Call Fstore on the additive shares of (read, addrM,M, ks), recovering (iM, 〈elemM〉).
3. Call Fmem on additive shares of (write, (iW, elemW), S)a.
4. Return (iM, 〈elem〉, 〈State〉)
a Any functionality that returns an updated share of S or M is assumed to update the held state State, but is
elided for notational simplicity.
– op = write, addrin ∈ S: As before the element is found in the stash, meaning in Step 2 when FEQ−DB is
called it returns the index the element is found at. This results in the element being read from the stash
being the element at addrin. In Step 3, as we have already found our element, the next dummy element
is read at addrM = ctr. Note, in order to maintain the invariant we must make sure elemin is written to
only one location in the stash and the dummy item we read from the store is also in the stash. It is here
that we exploit the fact that the item already in the stash at index ctr is our dummy element so we don’t
need to write it to the stash again. Instead we write elemin to the original copy’s index found in Step 2.
Thus we maintain the two part invariant. Finally, we return the element written for completeness’ sake
in the final step.
– op = read, addrin /∈ S: The element is not found in the stash in Step 2 by calling FEQ−DB , meaning
the element read from the stash, elemS, is the next dummy element, indexed by S = ctr. This means
we read the elemin from the store for Step 3 at addrM = addrin and retrieve the element we mean to
overwrite. We have to read its current value in order for it to count amongst the ‘read‘ elements in the
store, and maintain the invariant that elements that appear in the stash have been read in the store.
Finally, we overwrite the dummy element at iW = ctr (leaving the dummy amongst the unread elements
in the store, as we increment ctr for the next read) with the element elemW = elemin. We return the
elemin for completeness’ sake in the final step.
Security: We now argue security, via a sequence of hybrids. Recall, without loss of generality that we are
assuming the adversary assumes the role of Server 1
H0: Is the view of the adversary produced by Πaccess.
H1: In H1, we replace S′A and elem which is generated by the call to Fmem in Step 4 with the S′A in output.
We also replace elemA generated in the same step with elemA ∈ output. In this view, we still call Fmem
and compute the conditional random shares of iW, elem
W, elem but replace the stash and elem returned in




A follows as S
′A is generated by calling
16
Fig. 13. Simulator Simaccess for Πaccess Protocol
On input
(
input = (opA, elemA,MA, kA,S





















2. Find element in stash or read next dummy address:
(a) Compute additive shares of index i by calling FEQ−DB in Figure 4 on additive shares of (addrin, S),
receiving random additive shares (b, i) as output.
(b) Jointly compute random additive shares of iR such that:
iR =
{
i b = 1, element in stash.
ctr b = 0, element not in stash.
(c) Then recover elemS by calling Fmem on secret shares of (read, (iR, 0),S).
3. Look up either the next dummy element or the original element in the store:
(a) Jointly compute random additive shares of addrM:
addrM =
{
ctr b = 1, element in stash.
addrin b = 0, element not in stash.
(b) Generate elemM
$← [N ]× {0, 1}B and let elemAM be a random additive sharing of it.
4. Write the read elemM or input elemin back to stash:
(a) If op = read, jointly compute random additive shares of:
(iW, elemW, elem) =
{
(ctr, elemM, elemS) b = 1, element in stash.
(ctr, elemM, elemM) b = 0, element not in stash.
(b) If op = write, jointly compute random additive shares of:
(iW, elemW, elem) =
{
(iS, elemin, elemin) b = 1, element in stash.
(ctr, elemin, elemin) b = 0, element not in stash.
(c) Call Fmem on additive shares of (write, (iW, elemW),S)
5. Return as viewΠaccessA :
viewΠaccessA =
(















Fmem and elemA is generated as a uniformly random share in both views and thus are drawn from the same
distribution.
H2: In H2, we replace op2 and elem2in with a random shares, op′ and elem
′
in, and then execute the conditional
computation in Step 4 as in H0 (note this is the only step we change in this hybrid). This results in fresh
random shares for iW and elemW (recall we replaced elem
A in H1) that do not rely on Server 2’s share of op









two shares we replace are both indistinguishable as they are both random shares). We achieve this by having
the shares generated by the same conditional computation as in the original protocol, whose inputs are valid.
In particular, the generated op′ is drawn as uniform sample from {0, 1} (resulting in op ∈ {0, 1}) and elem′in
is sampled from [N ]× {0, 1}B (which also results in a valid element).
H3: In H3, we replace S2 with a random share, S′, only in the call to Fmem in Step 4, otherwise computation
continues as in H2. Indistinguishability of viewH2A and view
H3
A relies on the indistinguishability of the output
of Fmem, (elem′AS ,S′A) (S2 and S′ are indistinguishable as they are both random shares). The latter we have
already replaced in H1, the latter is drawn from the same distribution as the original protocol’s output as the
call to Fmem is made on valid input.
H4: In H4, we replace iM generated by the call to Fstore in Step 3 with the iM ∈ output. In this view, as with
H1, we still call the functionality but replace iM included in the view as mentioned above. Indistinguishability
of viewH3A and view
H4
A follows as in both views iM is generated by calling Fmem.
H5: In H5, we replace M2, k2, and elemAM with a random shares in Step 3; specifically we replace them with




A follows from the fact the shares in both views are
uniformly random (recall we replaced iM in H4), and the indistinguishability of any subsequent computation
that relies on the elemM. Specifically, the conditional computation in Step 4 relies on elemM and the direct
output is indistinguishable as they are uniformly random shares. We also must consider the call to Fmem
in Step 4 which takes elemW as input, because elemM is drawn from the same domain as the valid input the
output, elemW, is also valid. This results in the call to Fmem to also be indistinguishable.
H6: In H6, we replace addrin in Step 3 with a random address during the conditional computation. Indis-
tinguishability of viewH5A and view
H6
A follows directly from the indistinguishability of two random shares and
no subsequent computations rely on addrM.
H7: In H7, we replace addrin in Step 2 a random address, addr′in ∈ [N ] and S2 with a random share, S′, and
proceed to run the rest of steps as in previous hybrids. Indistinguishability of viewH6A and view
H7
A follows
from the security of the conditional computations and the indistinguishability of any subsequent computation
that relies on the two changed shares. We first consider the call to FEQ−DB, because addr′in ∈ [N ] it is a
valid address, as is S′. This results to a call to the functionality on valid inputs, resulting in a valid random
shares of b and i. Any subsequent conditional computations, whose security holds, that rely on shares of b
will proceed as in the original protocol and the shares produced will be indistinguishable. The rest of Step 2
that relies on i only matters when b = 1, if that is the case then it is a valid index and the call to Fmem
will result in a valid random sharing of elemS. No further computation relies on elemS as elem in Step 4 is
replaced in H1.
Note that the view in H7 is identical to the view produced by the simulator.
Lemma 4. Πpermute in Figure 8 implements functionality Fpermute in Figure 14 and for each party there













where input = (permute,M), output = (M′).
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Fig. 14. Functionality Fpermute
On input of (permute, 〈M̃〉):
1. Choose random permutation π and set M = {M̃π(i) | i ∈ [N ]}.
2. Let Ms be a random additive share of M, and return Ms to Server s.
Fig. 15. Simulator Simpermute for Πpermute Protocol
On input
(
λ, input = (permute,MA), output = (M′A)
)
:a
1. Run pk1, sk1 ← KeyGen(1λ), pk2, sk2 ← KeyGen(1λ)






| i ∈ [t]
}
.
3. Choose vector of random values R = {ri ∈ {0, 1}B}i∈[N ], and a random permutation π and update {elem1π(i)+
r1i | (σ1i , elem1i ) ∈ MA}. Permutes and re-randomize the other party’s encrypted shares: C2r = {c2π(i) ·
Encpk2(−r1i ) | c2i ∈ C2}.
4. Compute C1 = {Encpk1(elem1i ) | elem1i ∈ MA} and C1r = {Encpk1(elem1i ) | elem1i ∈ M′A}.












a Without loss of generality, we assume that A is assuming the role of Server 1
Proof (Lemma 4).
Correctness: We show that the correctness of Πpermute follows from the correctness of the re-randomizable
encryption. During permute, correctness is maintained for the re-randomized and permuted shares by the

























elem2π1◦π2(i) − r2i + r1π2(i)
)
(











Security: We now argue security, via a sequence of hybrids. Recall, without loss of generality that we are
assuming the adversary assumes the role of Server 1.
H0: Is the view of the adversary produced by Πpermute.
H1: In H1 we replace the encryption of Server 2 shares, C2, with the encryption of all-zero shares. Indistin-
guishability of viewH0A and view
H1
A follows directly from the indistinguishability of the encryption scheme.
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Fig. 16. Functionality Fstore
1. On input of (Init, 〈M〉): Choose PRF key k and for all elemi ∈ M compute σi = fk(addri) and let Σ =
{σi | i ∈ [N ]}. Set M = {(σi, elemi) | elemi ∈ M} and sort M in lexicographic order by σ. Let elemsi and ks be
random additive shares of elemi and k respectively, and M
s = {(σi, elemsi ) | elemi ∈ M}. Return (Σ,Ms, ks)
to Server s.
2. On input additive shares of (read, addri, k,M) from two parties return additive shares of M[iM] where σiM =
fk(addri) and iM to each server.
Fig. 17. Simulator Simstore for Πstore Protocol
On input
(
input = (Init,MA), output = (Σ,M′A, kA)
)
:
1. On inputs (kA, addr
A
i ) for all σi ∈ Σ, return σi.








input = (read, addrAi , kA,M
A), output = (elemA, iM)
)
:
1. On input (k1, addr
1
i ), find corresponding σi in M
A for elemA at index iM.
2. Return as V iewΠstoreA :
V iewΠstoreA =
(
input, iM, σi, elem
A
)
H2: In H2 we replace the re-randomized permuted shares for Server 1, C1r as generated by Πstore with the
re-randomized permuted shares from M′1 ∈ outputA, i.e. {Encpk1(elem
′1
i ) | elem
′1
i ∈ M′1}. Indistinguishability
of viewH1A and view
H2
A follows as both sets of shares are drawn from a uniform random distribution and
permuted by a random permutation.
Note that the view in H2 is identical to the view produced by the simulator.
Lemma 5. Πstore in Figure 9 implements functionality Fstore in Figure 16 and for each party there exists









where input = {(Init,M), (read, addr, k,M)}, output = {(Σ,M, k), (iM, elem)}.
Proof (Lemma 5).
Correctness: The correctness of Πstore follows directly from the correctness of ΠDOPRF and the pseudo-
randomness of the PRF. If two PRF outputs collide, it is possible that the wrong record is returned. The
probability of the output of PRF f colliding, and thus returning a wrong element, is close to e¬
N2
2λ by a
simple application of the birthday bound. For sufficiently large N (i.e. N > λ), this occurs with negligible
probability e−λ/2.
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Fig. 18. Functionality Fshuffle
On input (shuffle, State, I):
1. Let State = (M, k,S).
2. Let Mr be all unread elements in M, i.e. Mr /∈ I. Set R = Mr || S.
3. Let V = {(i, 0) | i ∈ [t]} and call Fmem on additive shared input (Init,V), receiving S′ as output.
4. Call Fpermute on (permute, 〈R〉) receiving M′ as output, which in turn is passed into Fstore as (Init,M′).
Finally, (M′′, k′) is received as output.
5. Server s returns random additive shares (S′s,M′′s, k′s).
Security: We now argue security, via a sequence of hybrids. Recall, without loss of generality that we are
assuming the adversary assumes the role of Server 1. We condition all hybrids on the event that no PRF f
outputs collide.
H0: Is the view of the distinguisher produced by Πstore.
H1: In H1, we replace the σi generated in the permute process by calling FDOPRF on (k1, addr1i ) and
(k2, addr
2
i ), with σ
′
i from Σ[i], where Σ is taken from output. We also replace during a lookup the σi returned
on input of (k1, addr
1
i ). Rather than returning the output of FDOPRF on both client’s input, the σ′i at M′[iM]
is used, where iM and M
′ are both taken from output. Indistinguishability of viewH3A and view
H2
A follows as
both σi and σ
′





ideal functionality computes σi directly, while the protocol computes it using FDOPRF , but both result in the
same output distribution.
H2: In H2 we replace kA generated as part of the protocol with the k′A ∈ output. Indistinguishability of
viewH1A and view
H2
A follows as both k
A are generated by sampling a uniformly random distribution.
Note that the view in H2 is identical to the view produced by the simulator.
Lemma 6. Πshuffle in Figure 10 implements functionality Fshuffle in Figure 18 and for each party there









where input = (shuffle,M, k,S) and output = (M′, k′,S′).
Proof (Lemma 6).
Correctness: The correctness of Πshuffle follows from the observation that the ideal functionality and
protocol execution produce identical output. Namely Fpermute, Fstore and Fmem are run on state generated
in the same way (M consisting of all elements in the stash and all unread elements, and S consisting of
dummy elements addressed at 1 through t.)
Security: We now argue security, via a sequence of hybrids.
H0: Is the view of the adversary produced by Πshuffle.
H1: In H1 we replace the call to Fmem, which generates S′A, with the S′A ∈ output. Indistinguishability of
viewH0A and view
H1
A follows as both S
A are generated by Fmem and thus are drawn from the same distribution.
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Fig. 19. Simulator Sim for Πshuffle Protocol
On input
(
input = (shuffle, I,MA, kA, S
A), output = (M′A, k′A, S
′A)
)
1. Let MAr be all unread elements in M
A, i.e. Mr /∈ I. Set RA = MAr || SA.
2. Let V = {(i, 0) | i ∈ [t]}.
3. Choose random permutation π. Let M′A = {elemπ(i) | (σi, elemi) ∈ M′′A}.










H2: InH2 we replace the call to Fpermute, which generates M′A, with the application of a random permutation
π−1 on elements (and not the tags σ) in M′′A in output. Indistinguishability of viewH1A and view
H2
A comes
from the indistinguishability of the distrubtions on the output shares of Fpermute and shares from M′′A with
a random permutation applied to them. Fstore does not change the shares themselves, leaving the values
sharing the same distribution. Which leaves the permutation being the only difference in the two hybrids
(recall Fstore sorts values lexicographically by σ, thus the shares in M′′A are in a different order) – both of
which are random permutations and generate the same distribution on the shares.
H3: In H3 we replace the call to Fstore, which generates (M′′A, kA), with the M′′A, kA ∈ output. Indistin-
guishability of viewH2A and view
H3
A follows as both M
′′A, kA are generated by Fstore and thus are drawn from
the same distribution.
Note that the view in H3 is identical to the view produced by the simulator.
4 Sublinear DORAM with Unlimited Reads
In this section, we introduce an alternative DORAM construction Π̃DORAM that also implements the Fmem
functionality with constant rounds, sublinear server work, and sublinear communication. This protocol differs
from the construction in Section 3 in that it does not attempt to hide whether a query is a read or write
operation, and in exchange it achieves better performance.
Specifically, the construction in this section only needs to invoke the shuffle functionality Fshuffle after
t write operations, independent of the number of read operations. In scenarios where writes are infrequent,
the amortized cost per read can have a small Oλ(N
ε) dependency on the database size N for any constant
ε > 0. To build the new DORAM protocol Π̃DORAM, we start from a SK-DEPIR that supports unlimited
reads while hiding access patterns, and we emulate the server using secure 2-party computation (which hides
the database contents as well).
We first describe how we instantiate the new version of store that relies on SK-DEPIR in Section 4.1,
then show how to use the new Fstore implementation in the larger Π̃DORAM protocol in Section 4.2. Finally
we show how to construct secure compuation of multivariate polynomial evaluation and interpolation using
FFT in Section 4.3.
4.1 Instantiating Fstore using secure computation of SK-DEPIR
In this section, we show that a secure 2-party computation (2PC) of the Canetti et al. construction leads
to an instantiation Π̃store of the Fstore functionality. The construction we present in this section achieves
sublinear communication with a constant number of rounds and quasilinear server work. To do so, we first
construct a 2PC protocol for a locally decodable code, and then we construct Π̃store as a 2PC of a secret
key doubly efficient private information retrieval (SK-DEPIR) protocol based on an LDC.
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Fig. 20. Π̃ldc protocol for secure 2-party computation of a Reed-Muller-style LDC
Given a binary field F, a subspace H ⊂ F, and an integer m, let N = |H|m and M = |F|m. Let (xi)i∈[r] be
arbitrary, distinct non-zero constants. Finally, define the bijections ι : [N ]→ Hm and δ : B → F via lexicographic
ordering.
On input (Enc, 〈D〉) for database D ∈ BN :
1. For all i ∈ [N ], compute shares of ci = ι(i) ∈ Hm and di = δ(D[i]) ∈ F.
2. Securely interpolate polynomial ψ : Fm → F of degree t from {(ci, di)}i∈[N ].
3. Securely evaluate E = (v, ψ(v))v∈Fm , the truth table of ψ on Fm. Output 〈E〉.
On input (Query, 〈q〉) for an index q ∈ [N ]:
1. Randomly choose a degree-t polynomial φ : F→ Fm such that φ(0) = ι(q).
2. Securely evaluate yi = φ(xi) for all i ∈ [r], and output shares (〈yi〉)i∈[r].
On input (Dec, (〈ai〉)i∈[r]):
1. Securely interpolate polynomial φ̃ : F→ F of degree r − 1 with φ̃(xi) = ai ∀i.
2. Output shares 〈δ−1(φ̃(0))〉 of the block corresponding to field element φ(0).
We focus on a block size B = `, so that each block can canonically be encoded as a field element in
F = GF(2`). Put another way, all references to the database size N are enumerated in terms of the number
of blocks, but if one desires a lower block length like B = 1 then N should instead be interpreted in terms
of the number of bits of the database.
2PC for a Locally Decodable Code. First, we construct a secure 2-party computation protocol Π̃ldc
of the locally decodable code used by Canetti et al. [5], which is a Reed-Muller-based polynomial code. We
depict our construction in Figure 20, in which the two parties maintain boolean secret shares of all input,
intermediate, and output data from the LDC of Canetti et al.
Our 2PC protocol Π̃ldc operates over a binary field F = F2[z]/(ρ(z)) of size |F| = 2` defined using an
irreducible polynomial ρ of degree `. Elements of F can be represented using bitstrings of length ` in the
canonical way, such that the addition of two elements corresponds to the boolean-xor of their bitstring
values. Furthermore, we consider H ⊂ F to be the subspace of F of size |H| = 2h containing the span of basis
elements H = {zh−1, zh−2, . . . , z, 1}; this corresponds to bitstrings that have `− h leading 0s. Also, protocol
Π̃ldc performs operations in the vector spaces H
m and Fm of sizes N = |H|m and M = |F|m, respectively.
We claim that this protocol can be securely evaluated efficiently and non-interactively. Throughout this
section, we only consider boolean secret shares 〈·〉, so that field addition and scalar multiplication can be
performed locally by each server, without interaction. Hence, our claim amounts to the statement that all
operations in Π̃ldc involve only linear algebra in the field along with concatenation/truncation of bitstrings,
because all of these operations commute with boolean-xor.
Theorem 2. Let m < t < r < N < M be parameters of a Reed-Muller locally decodable code such that
N and M are powers of 2. Then, protocol Π̃ldc in Fig. 20 is a secure two-party computation of an LDC
with local decodability and smoothness. Furthermore, Π̃ldc requires no interaction between parties, and its
computation cost is O(M log2(M)) for Enc and O(r2) for Query and Dec.
Proof. Our 2PC protocol Π̃ldc contains methods for the servers to securely compute each of the 3 meth-
ods of an LDC on boolean secret-shared data. Ergo, the local decodability and smoothness of Π̃ldc follow
immediately from the same properties of its non-secure-computation counterpart [5].
There are four types of operations used throughout Π̃ldc, and we show below how to compute all of them
non-interactively. The first two operations are used in Enc, and the last two in Query and Dec.
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Fig. 21. Π̃store protocol, based on secure 2PC of the SK-DEPIR scheme of Canetti et al., given any integers
m < t < r < u < N < M satisfying the HPN assumption.
On input (Init, 〈M〉), run the following steps of the SK-DEPIR:
1. KeyGen: Randomly choose a subset T ⊂ [u] of size r.
2. Process: Run Π̃ldc on input (Enc, 〈M〉) to obtain shares of encoded database 〈E〉. Run u instances of
Πpermute on 〈E〉 to form permuted {〈Ei〉}i∈[u]. Run Πstore on input (Init,∪i∈[u],j∈[M ](i ‖ j, 〈Ei[j]〉) to ob-
tain (Σ, 〈M〉, 〈k〉).
3. Output (Σ, 〈M〉 ∪ 〈T 〉, 〈k〉), the state from KeyGen and Process.
On input (read, 〈addr〉, 〈k〉, 〈M〉 ∪ 〈T 〉), run the following steps of the SK-DEPIR:
1. Query: Run Π̃ldc on input (Query, 〈addr〉) to obtain shares of r elements Y = ((〈yi〉)i∈[r]. Construct a longer
vector Ỹ = (〈ỹi〉)i∈[u] such that Ỹ |T = Y and the remaining elements {ỹi | i ∈ [u]\T} are chosen uniformly
at random.
2. Resp: For i ∈ [u], run Πstore on (read, (i ‖ 〈ỹi〉), 〈k〉, 〈M〉). Construct a list L = (〈elemi〉)i∈[u] of the shares of
elements returned in response.
3. Dec: Truncate the list 〈L|T 〉 to responses of queries in Y . Run Π̃ldc on input (Dec, 〈L|T 〉) to obtain shares
of a field element 〈val〉. Output (〈addr〉, 〈val〉).
– Computing the lexicographic maps δ and ι: δ is the identity operation on bitstrings, and thanks to the
specific basis we chose for H, computing ι(i) merely involves partitioning the bits of i ∈ [N ] into m strings
of length h, padding with 0s in the ` − h leftmost bits. These string operations can can be performed
independently in O(N) time on each boolean secret share of i.
– Interpolation and evaluation of multivariate polynomial ψ: this task is challenging; we show in Section
4.3 a non-interactive secure 2-party protocol that performs these operations across all of Fm in time
O(M log2(M)).
– Random sampling of multivariate polynomial φ: the parties already hold shares of the constant term
φ0 = φ(0), and they can randomly choose all other t coefficients in O(t) time.
– Evaluation of φ at r points and interpolation of φ̃ from r points: since the evaluation points (xi)i∈[r]
are publicly known, the coefficients for polynomial evaluation and Lagrange interpolation can also be
publicly (pre-)computed. Ergo, evaluating or interpolating a polynomial of degree ≤ r only involves
linear algebra and takes O(r2) time.
Constructing Π̃store as a secure computation of SK-DEPIR. Next, we construct a new protocol Π̃store
that also instantiates Fstore . It is a secure two-party computation of the client-server SK-DEPIR protocol of
Canetti et al. [5] in which the two parties jointly emulate the server. In Fig. 21, we show simultaneously a
secure computation of the SK-DEPIR protocol and how its methods (along with Π̃ldc, Πpermute, and Πstore)
combine to instantiate a new read-only storage protocol Π̃store.
At a high level, the protocol Π̃store operates as follows. During initialization, the parties collectively
construct the LDC encoding of the database, permute it u times, and store the concatenation of these u
encoded databases E0,E1, . . . ,Eu−1 in an instance of Πstore; the address corresponding to each element E
i[j]
is the concatenation of the the instance number i and the location j within this instance. During a read
operation, the parties look up Π̃store at one location within each permuted database E
i; r of these lookup
operations retrieve data that can collectively be used to decode the desired value, and the remaining u − r
lookups are “decoy” lookups that provide security under the HPN assumption.
Assumption 1 (Hidden permutation with noise) Let m < t < r < u < |F| be functions of λ and N
such that |F|m = poly(λ) and |F|t = λω(1). Define the distribution D(π, addr, T ) that executes the Query
protocol of Π̃store in the clear (without secret shares) to retrieve a set of vectors Ỹ = (ỹi)i∈[u] and then
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outputs Z = (π(ỹi))i∈[u], when given a randomly-chosen permutation π : Fm  Fm, integer addr ∈ N , and
set T ⊂ [u] as input. The hidden permutation with noise assumption states that the distribution D(π, addr, T )
is computationally indistinguishable from the uniform distribution over (Fm)u.
Lemma 2 shows two settings of parameters that satisfy the HPN assumption. Using these parameters,
we show that Π̃store is an efficient and secure read-only data store.
Theorem 3. Under the HPN assumption, the protocol Π̃store in Fig. 21 securely implements functionality
Fstore with constant rounds of communication. Furthermore, given any constant ε > 0, there exist parameters
m, t, u, and M such that the computation and communication cost of Π̃store is:
– Oλ(N
1+ε) for Init and Oλ(N
ε) for read, or
– Oλ(poly(N)) for Init and Oλ(log(N)) for read.
Proof. Our 2PC protocol Π̃store computes all methods of the Canetti et al. SK-DEPIR protocol over boolean
secret-shared data, In particular, there exist constant-round secure computation protocols for all set opera-
tions in Π̃store.
– Within KeyGen: to choose a subset T ⊂ [u], form a set of r 1s and (u− r) 0s, then permute this set using
Πpermute. The result is a secret-shared indicator vector 〈T 〉 of length u indicating which elements are in
T .
– Within Query: form the set Ỹ by oversampling. Run the LDC Query operation on u values rather than
r values (using an LDC protocol with u constants xi) to compute Y = (〈yi〉)i∈[u], and let Ȳ = (〈ȳ〉)i∈[u]
be a secret-shared set of u random values. Compute Ỹ by multiplexing: in parallel, set each element
〈ỹi〉 = 〈T [i] ∧ yi ⊕ (T [i]⊕ 1) ∧ ȳi〉. (Since all values are boolean secret-shared, the bitwise-AND should
be performed in 1 round between the T [i] and each bit of yi in turn, and similarly for the second term.)
– To truncate the list 〈L〉|T within Dec: first form a secret sharing of the index vector 〈I〉 that equals 0
at decoy values and where I|T = {1, 2, . . . , r} at real values by bit composing 〈T 〉 to an additive secret
sharing [[T ]] [8,27], computing [[Ii]] = [[T i ·
∑i
j=0 T j ]] ∀i ∈ [u], and bit decomposing [[I]] into a boolean
secret sharing 〈I〉. Then, concatenate componentwise the elements of 〈I〉 and 〈L〉, permute this set using
Πpermute, open all shares of indices I in parallel, and locally sort the values of 〈L〉 using the indices.
The computational cost of Query is O(u2) due to oversampling, and the cost of the set truncation within
Dec is O(u log(u)) as shown by Damgard et al. [8].
As a secure two-party computation of an existing SK-DEPIR scheme, Π̃store inherits the correctness
property from Def. 2, which states that the read operation always returns the correct decoded database
entry. Additionally, the use of Πpermute within the protocol provides the random permutation π as required
for use of the HPN assumption, so we also inherit the indistinguishability-style security property from Def. 2.
Using these properties, it is straightforward to prove that Π̃store instantiates Fstore using a similar sequence
of hybrids as in the proof of Lemma 5; we omit the details for brevity.
The claims about computational costs follow from Lemma 2 plus the following two observations. First,
the cost of Init is dominated by the cost of the SK-DEPIR Process method, since the O(M) cost of Πpermute
and the O(u log(u)) cost of the oblivious search in KeyGen are smaller than the parameters in Lemma 2.
Second, the cost of read is dominated by the cost of the LDC Query and Dec since the call to Πstore within
Resp costs O(log(u ·M)) as per Table 2, which is Oλ(log(N)) since u < N and M = Oλ(N).
4.2 The new DORAM construction Π̃DORAM
In this section, we show how to construct the new DORAM construction Π̃DORAM using this new instanti-
ation Π̃store of the Fstore functionality, which only needs to be shuffled and reconstructed after a specified
bound t of write operations have been performed, irrespective of the number of read operations.
The updated Π̃DORAM protocol is shown in Figure 22. The protocol now initializes two versions of the
store, one to keep track of which elements are written and leaks access patterns and the other, Π̃access, that
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Fig. 22. Π̃DORAM Protocol
On (Init, 〈DB〉):
1. Server 1 computes V = {(i, 0) | i ∈ [t]}
2. Each server calls Π̃shuffle on (shuffle, I, State)) where I = {} and State = {DB || V, 0, {}}. Server s receives
(Ss,Ms, M̃s, ks, k̃s) as output.
3. Let ctr = 1 and I = {}. For Server s its current state is States =
(
ctr, Ss,Ms, M̃s, ks, k̃s
)
, returns States
On additive shares of (op, elem,State):
1. If ctr = t, call Π̃shuffle on (shuffle, I,State) and update state for Server s with (S
′s,M′s, M̃′
s
, k′s, k̃′s). Set
ctr = 1 and I = {}.
2. Call Π̃access on additive shares (opi, elemi, State), recovering (iM, 〈elem〉, 〈State〉) and update state for Server
s with S′s.
3. If op = write, set I = I ∪ iM and ctr = ctr + 1
4. Return (elems, States) to Server s.
supports unlimited reads and does not leak access patterns. This first store is critical to maintain invariant
used for reshuffling. In order to know what written elements that are found in the stash, we use this store
to keep track of the items ‘written’ into the store. With the distinction between reads and writes no longer
hidden, Π̃DORAM only increments the epoch counter when a write is performed. Reads do not count towards
the contents of the stash.
The most significant change is within the access protocol, shown in Figure 23. It now differentiates
between read and write operations. For a read operation it calls Π̃store and does not write anything back to
the stash. The write operation continues to be unchanged from the original protocol.
Reshuffling is shown in Figure 24. When it comes time to reshuffle after t writes, the protocol is similar
except in one key difference. Though we now support two different stores, we perform the concatenation
with elements in the stash only with the original store, not the augmented SK-DEPIR store. The latter does
not keep track of the elements read (the indices iM returned by Π̃store are simply random values and do not
allow for the recovery of the elements). Instead we have to rely on the unread elements in the original store;
namely the elements that were not written to as part of the store. The unread elements are identical to the
elements found in the augmented store, so concatentation will result in the correct operation of Π̃shuffle.
The only other change is to instantiate these two stores, rather than the one store used within the original
protocol.
We also consider the complexity of these new schemes in Table 3. Recall that we use Oλ to indicate
complexities that only depend on N , ignoring any poly(λ) terms. The main difference between the complexity
of our two schemes is the blowup incurred by the new implementation of Π̃store. The LDC encoding incurs
a Oλ(N
1+ε) overhead for any choice of ε > 0. This means any protocols that were original dominated by
the computation or bandwidth of Π̃store initialization inherit this new cost. Recall in the original scheme
the dominate cost of Πaccess was the linear scan of the stash. In this setting, with the disparity of reads vs
writes, we consider a smaller stash size. If we assume one write for every N reads and our smaller stash size,
Π̃DORAM accesses amortize to be Oλ(N
ε).
4.3 2PC for Multivariate FFT over Binary Fields
The one remaining task in the specification of protocol Π̃ldc is to construct a secure computation of mul-
tivariate polynomial evaluation and interpolation. One effective, but slow, technique is to use Lagrange
interpolation. For a univariate polynomial p =
∑
i p · xi, we can transform secret shares of a vector p = (p)
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Fig. 23. Π̃access Protocol
1. On additive shares of (op, elemin, State), let elemin = (addrin, valin) and State =
(




S is an array of elem.
2. Find element in stash or read next dummy address:
(a) Compute additive shares of index i by calling FEQ−DB in Figure 4 on additive shares of (addrin, S),
receiving random additive shares (b, i) as output.
(b) Jointly compute random additive shares of iS such that:
iS =
{
i b = 1, element in stash.
ctr b = 0, element not in stash.
(c) Then recover elemS by calling Fmem on secret shares of (read, (iS, 0),S).
3. Look up either the next dummy element or the original element in the store:
(a) Jointly compute random additive shares of addrM:
addrM =
{
ctr b = 1, element in stash.
addrin b = 0, element not in stash.
(b) If op = read, call Π̃store on the additive shares of (read, addrM, M̃, k̃s), recovering (iM, 〈elemM〉).
(c) If op = write, call Fstore on the additive shares of (read, addrM,M, ks), recovering (iM, 〈elemM〉).
4. Write the read elemM or input elemin back to stash if the operation is a write:
(a) If op = read, jointly compute random additive shares of:
elem =
{
elemS b = 1, element in stash.
elemM b = 0, element not in stash.
(b) If op = write, jointly compute random additive shares of:
(iW, elemW, elem) =
{
(iS, elemin, elemin) b = 1, element in stash.
(ctr, elemin, elemin) b = 0, element not in stash.
Then call Fmem on additive shares of (write, (iW, elemW), S)a.
5. Server s returns (iM, 〈elem〉, 〈State〉).
a Any functionality that returns an updated share of S or M is assumed to update the held state State, but is
elided for notational simplicity.
Fig. 24. Π̃shuffle Protocol
On input (shuffle, State, I):
1. Let State =
(




2. Let Msr be all unread elements in M
1 and M2, i.e. Mr /∈ I. Set Rs = Msr || Ss.
3. Let V = {(i, 0) | i ∈ [t]} each server calls Fmem on additive shared input (Init,V). Server s receives Ss as
output.
4. Servers 1 and 2 call Fpermute on (permute, 〈R〉). Server s receives (M′s) as output, which in turn it calls
Fstore on (Init,M′s) and receives (Ms, ks) as output. Then calls Π̃store on (Init,M′s) and receives (M̃s, k̃s) as
output.
5. Server s returns (Ss,Ms, M̃s, ks, k̃s).
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Table 3. A evaluation of each of the protocol’s server computation, bandwidth and rounds of communication where
stash size, t = N ε. Note that we assume N reads for every 1 write and Π̃DORAM has been amortized where appropriate.



















Fig. 25. Π̃1FFT protocol for secure 2-party computation of the Additive Fast Fourier Transform of a univariate
polynomial p in a binary field F.
Input: public integer h and basisH = {v0, v1, . . . , vh−1} of a subspace of F of size 2h, plus shares 〈p〉 of coefficients
of a polynomial p ∈ F[x] of degree 2h − 1.
Output: shares 〈p̂〉 = FFT(h,H, 〈p〉) of the evaluations of p on all points spanned by H, in the ordering specified
by H[i] =
∑h−1
j=0 ijvj , where ij = the j
th bit of i.
1. As the base case: if h = 1, then return (〈p(0)〉, 〈p(v0)〉). For a degree-1 polynomial p, we compute 〈p(0)〉 =
〈p0〉 and 〈p(v0)〉 = 〈p0〉+ v0〈p1〉.
2. Compute the new bases H̄ = {v̄i} and H̃ = {ṽi} of size h − 1 containing basis elements v̄i = vi · v−1h−1 and
ṽi = v̄
2
i − v̄i for all i ∈ [h− 1].
3. Compute coefficients 〈qi〉 = vih−1 · 〈pi〉 of the polynomial q = p(vh−1 · x).
4. Execute the Taylor expansion algorithm T(h, 〈q〉) in Fig. 26. Let 〈f〉 and 〈g〉 denote the shares of the
resulting polynomials, each of degree 2h−1 − 1.
5. Recursively compute 〈f̂〉 = FFT(h− 1, H̃, 〈f〉) and 〈ĝ〉 = FFT(h− 1, H̃, 〈g〉).
6. Set 〈p̂i〉 = 〈f̂i〉+ H̄[i] · 〈ĝi〉 and 〈p̂i+2h−1〉 = 〈p̂i〉+ 〈ĝi〉 ∀i ∈ [2h−1]. Return p̂.
of coefficients into shares of the vector p̂ = (p(i)) of its evaluation at all points (or vice-versa) via multipli-
cation by the Vandermonde matrix p̂ = A · p, or its inverse p = A−1 · p̂, and shares of this matrix-vector
multiplication can be computed locally by each party since the Vandermonde matrix A is public. However,
the computational cost for matrix-vector multiplication is Ω(N2).
The Fast Fourier Transform (FFT) [7] is a well-known algorithm for computing polynomial evaluation in
quasilinear time, and the Inverse FFT similarly calculates polynomial interpolation efficiently. The fastest
known FFT for binary fields is the additive FFT algorithm by Gao and Mateer [11]. As its name suggests,
this algorithm solely involves linear operations. In this section, we design a secure computation protocol
Π̃mFFT of FFT for multilinear polynomials over binary fields that can be performed locally (i.e., without
interaction) with quasilinear computational cost. While this contribution may be of independent interest,
in this work it completes the task from Section 4.1 of constructing a non-interactive Π̃ldc protocol with
quasilinear (rather than quadratic) computation cost. For example, in the Enc protocol within Π̃ldc, it allows
for securely computing the coefficients of the polynomial ψ : Hm → F in time O(N log2N) and securely
evaluating the polynomial ψ at all locations in Fm in time O(M log2M).
We describe this protocol in two steps. First, we show how to securely evaluate FFT for univariate
polynomials (building a secure computation of Taylor series expansion as a building block). Second, we
bootstrap to a secure evaluation of FFT for multivariate polynomials. For brevity, we show these FFT
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Fig. 26. Protocol for Taylor expansion of a polynomial q(x) ∈ F[x] at x2 − x.
Input: public integer h, shares of coefficients 〈q〉 of a polynomial of degree 2h − 1.
Output: 〈f〉, 〈g〉 = T(h, 〈q〉) such that each vector is of length ≤ 2h−1 and they collectively form the Taylor
series expansion q(x) =
∑2h−1
i=0 (fi + gix) · (x
2 − x)i.
1. As the base case: if h = 1 so deg(q) = 1, return 〈f0〉 = 〈q0〉 and 〈g0〉 = 〈q1〉.
2. Partition the vector 〈q〉 into 〈t0〉 containing the first 2h−1 elements, 〈t1〉 containing the next 2h−2 elements,
and 〈t2〉 containing the last 2h−2 elements.
3. Compute the vectors 〈t〉 = 〈t1〉 + 〈t2〉 of length 2h−2, 〈q0〉 = 〈t0〉 + (0 ‖ 〈t〉) of length 2h−1, and 〈q1〉 =
(〈t〉 ‖ 〈t2〉) of length 2h−1. Here, 0 denotes the vector containing 2h−2 zero elements, and ‖ denotes vector
concatenation.
4. Recursively, find 〈f0〉, 〈g0〉 = T(h− 1, 〈q0〉) and 〈f1〉, 〈g1〉 = T(h− 1, 〈q1〉).
5. Return the concatenated vectors 〈f〉 = 〈f0〉 ‖ 〈f1〉 and 〈g〉 = 〈g0〉 ‖ 〈g1〉.
protocols only in the forward (polynomial evaluation) direction. It is straightforward to validate that the same
techniques apply to construct a secure computation protocol of inverse FFT (i.e., polynomial interpolation)
in quasilinear time.
2PC protocol Π̃1FFT for univariate FFT. In this section, we present a secure two-party computation
protocol Π̃1FFT. Let H ⊂ F be a subspace (possibly the entire field) of size |H| = 2h defined by a basis H,
and let p =
∑2h−1
i=0 pi ·xi be a univariate polynomial of degree less than 2h. This protocol begins with shares
of the 2h coefficients 〈p〉 = (〈pi〉)i∈[2h] of the polynomial, and it returns the shares 〈p̂〉 = (〈p(i)〉)i∈[2h] of its
evaluation at all 2h points in H.
The protocol Π̃1FFT is shown in Fig. 25, and it uses the Taylor series expansion algorithm in Fig. 26 as
a building block. Each step of these algorithms only involves addition and scalar multiplication of secret-
shared values, so the secure computation Π̃1FFT can be performed locally. These algorithms are precisely
the secret-shared versions of their counterparts in Gao and Mateer [11].
We provide a high-level intuition of Π̃1FFT when considering the basis H = {zh−1, zh−2, . . . , z, 1}, in
which case q = p; full details are given in [11]. The core idea of the Fast Fourier Transform is to reduce
the evaluation of one polynomial q into the evaluation of two polynomials f and g of half the degree, plus
quasilinear work to “stitch” the results together into an evaluation of q. Gao and Mateer [11] show how this
can be done over binary fields, based on these observations:
– The Taylor expansion q(x) =
∑2h−1
i=0 (fi+gix)·(x2−x)i leads to an equation q(x) = f(x2−x)+x·g(x2−x)
involving polynomials f(z) ,
∑2h−1
i=0 fi · zi and g(z) ,
∑2h−1
i=0 g · zi of lower degree 2h−1 − 1.
– The function x 7→ x2 − x is 2-to-1, and specifically it maps the 2h-sized space spanned by H into the
smaller 2h−1 space spanned by the basis H̃.
Ergo, in order to evaluate the polynomial q at all points spanned by H, it suffices to evaluate polynomials
f and g at all points spanned by the smaller basis H̃ and combine the results using the Taylor expansion
q(x) = f(x2 − x) + x · g(x2 − x).
We provide a secure 2-party computation of Gao and Mateer’s method of computing the Taylor expansion
of q in Fig. 26, and we provide a 2PC of polynomial evaluation in Fig. 25. The only operations that involve
secret-shared data are linear combinations and splitting/joining vectors, all of which can be performed locally.
Note that step 2 of Fig. 25 involves more complicated algebra, but it only involves public (non-secret-shared)
values, so it can be performed locally and pre-computed before parties receive their input shares.
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Fig. 27. Π̃mFFT protocol for secure 2-party evaluation of a multivariate polynomial p(x0, . . . , xm−1) at all points
in a subspace Hm ∈ Fm.
Input: shares of coefficients 〈p〉 of an m-variate polynomial p of total degree 2h − 1.
Output: shares 〈p̂〉 of evaluations p(x) at all points x ∈ Hm.
1. As the base case: if m = 1, then run protocol Π̃1FFT as shown in Fig. 25.




0 · pi(x1, x2, . . . , xm−1). Observe that the parties collectively
hold shares of the coefficients of each 〈pi〉.
3. Recursively, get shares 〈p̂i〉 of evaluations of each pi at all points in Hm−1.
4. For each vector c ∈ Hm−1, compute shares of the evaluation of the univariate polynomial 〈p(x0, c)〉 =∑2h−1
i=0 〈pi(c)〉 · x
i
0 on all points in H using Π̃1FFT.
2PC protocol Π̃mFFT for multivariate FFT. Recall that the locally decodable code used in Π̃ldc is based
on Reed-Muller codes, and as a result it uses multivariate polynomials. Here, we show how to bootstrap from
an FFT for univariate polynomials into one for multivariate polynomials. The full protocol is shown in Fig.
27, and it is based on a technique used by Kedlaya and Umans [22].
Protocol Π̃mFFT operates via recursion over many evaluations of univariate polynomials. Given an m-
variate polynomial p of total degree < 2h − 1 for which the parties have shares of all coefficients, we





pi(x1, x2, . . . , xm−1). We can evaluate the (m− 1)-variate polynomials pi recursively, and use the results to
evaluate the univariate polynomial over x0. Since each univariate polynomial evaluation takes time quasilinear
in |H|, a simple recurrence relation shows that the entire evaluation is quasilinear in |H|m = N . This
completes the construction, and it is the necessary building block to complete the proof of Theorem 2 and
achieve quasilinear server computation for our LDC protocol.
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